Konstantin Pobedonotsev, On Parliamentary Democracy
A legal scholar by training, Konstantin Pobedonotsev (1827-1907) rose swiftly through the ranks of the Imperial bureaucracy. Among his achievements was a major role in drafting the judicial reforms of 1864. He was named one of the Imperial family tutors in 1865 and was assigned to the education of the future Alexander III. In 1880 he was appointed Procurator of the Holy Synod. He would hold this potentially powerful Church office until 1905. After Alexander became Tsar in 1881, his former tutor acquired enormous influence within court circles and the government. The scope of this influence included the upbringing of the future Nicholas II, whose education Pobedonotsev was directed to personally supervise. Personally cold and distant, as the photo above suggests, Pobedonotsev was known for his impassioned defense of the Russian status quo. He used his considerable rhetorical skills to oppose just about any change imaginable-- especially trends and developments that smacked of reform. Liberals thus regarded him (rightly) as a dangerous, elitist reactionary. Russia's revolutionaries typically viewed him as evil incarnate.
1. According to Pobedonotsev, how does parliamentary democracy work in the ideal?
2. How does he say it operates in practice?
3. How does Pobedonotsev describe the movement for parliamentary democracy in Russia?
4. Why might he think that Russia is not suited for parliamentary democracy in general, and direct government in particular?
What is this 'freedom' which agitates so many minds, inspires so many insensate actions and so many wild speeches, and leads the people so often to misfortune? In the democratic sense of the word, freedom is the right of political power, or (to put it differently) the right to participate in the government of the State….
Forever extending its base, the new Democracy now aspires to universal suffrage. This is a fatal error, one of the most remarkable in the history of mankind. By this means, the political power so passionately demanded by Democracy would be shattered into a number of infinitesimal bits, with each citizen acquiring a single one. What would he do with it, then? How would he employ it? In the final analysis, it has been shown incontrovertably that Democracy violates its sacred formula of "Freedom inseparably linked to Equality" in attaining this aim. It has been shown that the apparently equal distribution of "freedom" among everyone actually involves the total destruction of equality. Each vote, representing an inconsiderable fragment of power, by itself signifies nothing. Only an aggregation of votes has a certain relative value….
In a Democracy, the real rulers are the dexterous manipulators of votes (and their henchmen), the mechanics who so skillfully pull the hidden strings that move the puppets in the arena of democratic elections. Men of this kind are always ready with loud speeches extolling equality. In reality, they rule the people as any despot or military dictator might.... The history of mankind testifies that the most necessary and fruitful reforms -- the most durable measures -- have emanated from the supreme will of statesmen, or from a minority enlightened by lofty ideas and deep knowledge. It testifies that on the contrary, the extension of the representative principle is accompanied by the abasement of political ideas and the vulgarization of opinions in the mass of the electors....
Among the falsest of political principles is the principle of the sovereignty of the people, the principle that all power issues from the people and is based upon the national will -- a principle which unhappily has become more firmly established since the time of the French Revolution. Thence proceeds the theory of Parliamentarism, which, up to the present day, has deluded much of the so-called "intelligentsia," and unhappily infatuated certain foolish Russians. It continues to maintain its hold on many minds with the obstinacy of a narrow fanaticism, although every day its falsehood is exposed more clearly to the world.
In what does the theory of Parliamentarism consist? It is supposed that the people in its assemblies makes its own laws, and elects responsible officers to execute its will. Such is the ideal conception. Its immediate realization is impossible. The historical development of society necessitates that local communities increase in numbers and complexity; that separate races be assimilated, or, retaining their polities and languages, unite under a single flag; and that territorial expansion continue indefinitely. Under such conditions, direct government by the people is impracticable. The people must, therefore, delegate its right of power to its representatives, and invest them with administrative autonomy. These representatives in turn cannot govern immediately, but are compelled to elect a still smaller number of trustworthy persons (ministers) to whom they entrust the preparation and execution of the laws, the apportionment and collection of taxes, the appointment of subordinate officials, and the disposition of the fighting forces.
This mechanism is quite symmetrical in the abstract. For its proper operation many conditions are essential. The working of the political machine is based on impersonal forces constantly acting and completely balanced. It may act successfully only when the delegates of the people abdicate their personalities; when on the benches of Parliament sit mechanical fulfillers of the people's behests; when the ministers of State remain impersonal, absolute executors of the will of the majority; when the elected representatives of the people are capable of understanding precisely, and executing conscientiously, the program of activity, mathematically expressed, which has been delivered to them. Given such conditions, the machine would work exactly and would accomplish its purpose. The law would actually embody the will of the people! Administrative measures would actually emanate from Parliament. The pillars of the State would actually rest on the elective assemblies, and each citizen would directly and consciously participate in the management of public affairs.
Such is the theory. Now let us look at the practice. Even in the classic countries of Parliamentarism, reality satisfies none of the conditions I have enumerated. Elections in no way express the will of the electors. Popular representatives are in no way restricted by the opinions of their constituents, but are guided by their own views and considerations, modified by the tactics of their opponents. In actuality, ministers are autocratic, and they rule (rather than are ruled by) Parliament. They attain power and lose power not by virtue of the will of the people, but through immense personal influence, or the influence of a strong party which either places them in power or drives them from it. They dispose of the force and resources of the nation at will. They grant immunities and favours, they maintain a multitude of idlers at the expense of the people, and they fear no censure while they enjoy majority support in Parliament. This they maintain by distributing bounties from the rich tables that the State has put at their disposal. In reality, the ministers are as irresponsible as the representatives of the people. Mistakes, abuse of power, and arbitrary acts are daily occurrences. Yet how often do we hear of serious sanctions against a minister? Perhaps once in fifty years a minister is tried for his crimes, with a result that is contemptible when compared with the celebrity attending the solemn proceedings.
This is how the representative principle works in practice. The ambitious man comes before his fellow citizens, and strives by every means to convince them that he (more than any other) is worthy of their confidence. What motives impel him to this quest? It is hard to believe that he is impelled by disinterested zeal for the public good....
On election day, a few people give their votes intelligently. These are the influential electors, individuals whom it has been worthwhile to convince in private. The mass of electors, after the practice of the herd, votes for one of the candidates nominated by the committees. Not a one of them exactly knows the man, or considers his character, his capacity, his convictions. All vote merely because they have heard his name so often. It would be vain to struggle against this herd. If a level-headed elector wished to act intelligently in such a grave affair, and not to give way to the violence of the committee, he either would have to abstain altogether or else vote for his candidate according to his conviction. However he might act, he could not prevent the election of the candidate favored by the mass of frivolous, indifferent, and prejudiced electors.
In theory, the elected candidate must be the favorite of the majority. In fact he is the favorite of a minority, sometimes very small but representing an organized force (while the majority, like sand, has no coherence, and is therefore incapable of resisting the clique and the faction). In theory, the election favors the intelligent and capable. In reality, it favors the pushing and impudent. It might be thought that education, experience, conscientiousness in work, and wisdom in affairs, would be essential requirements in the candidate; in reality, whether these qualities exist or not, they are in no way needed in the struggle of the election, where the essential qualities are audacity, a combination of impudence and oratory, and even some vulgarity, which invariably acts on the masses; modesty, in union with delicacy of feeling and thought, is worth nothing....
By nature, men are divided into two classes: those who tolerate no power above them, and therefore of necessity strive to rule others; and those who by their nature dread the responsibility inseparable from independent action, and who shrink from any resolute exercise of will. These were born for submission, and together constitute a herd which follows men of will and resolution (who form the minority). Thus the most talented persons submit willingly, and gladly entrust to stronger hands the control of affairs and the moral responsibility for their direction. Instinctively they seek a leader, and become his obedient instruments, inspired by the conviction that he will lead them to victory -- and, often, to ruin. Thus all the important actions of Parliament are controlled by the leaders of the party, who inspire all decision, who lead in combat, and profit by victory. The public sessions are no more than a spectacle for the masses. Speeches are delivered to sustain the fiction of Parliamentarism. But seldom does a speech by itself affect the decision of Parliament in a grave affair. Speechmaking serves the glory of orators, the increase of their popularity, and the making of their careers. Only on rare occasions does it affect the distribution of votes. Majorities and minorities usually are decided before the session begins. Such is the complicated mechanism of the Parliamentary farce. Such is the great political lie which dominates our age....
Such is the Parliamentary institution, exalted as the summit and crown of the edifice of State. It is sad to think that even in Russia, men aspire to the establishment of this falsehood among us. It is sad to think that our professors glorify representative government to their young pupils as the ideal of political science. It is sad to think that our newspapers pursue it in their articles and feuilletons, (1) under the name of justice and order, without troubling to take an unprejudiced look at the workings of the parliamentary machine. Yet even where centuries have sanctified its existence, faith already decays. The Liberal intelligence exalts it, but the people groan under its despotism, and recognize its falsehood. We may not see the overthrow of this idol, which contemporary thought in its vanity still continues to worship. However our children and grand children assuredly will....
(1) Feuilleton = the part of a European newspaper devoted to light fiction, reviews, and articles of general entertainment.
Source: K. P. Pobyedonotseff, Reflections of a Russian Statesman, trans. R. C. Long (London: Grant Richard & Co., 1898). Original revision Nathaniel Knight. Re-revised (syntax simplifications, repunctuation, and other emendations) Jon Bone.