Nicholas II, Manifesto On The Improvement Of Order In The State
Sergei Witte, excerpt on the Manifesto from The Memoirs Of Count Witte
In 1903, Count Sergei Witte became president of the Council of Ministers. This made him (at least nominally) the highest-ranking member of the government under Nicholas II. Convinced that Russia's interests in the Far East were best served by commerce and railroad-building, not belligerence, Witte strongly opposed the drift to war with Japan over (among other problems) the fate of Korea. He urged the Tsar to make political concessions, at first to allay general domestic discontent and in a later memorandum, to defuse the revolutionary crisis of 1905. In the first of the two texts below, Nicholas II did indeed address Witte's call for steps to restore public order. The result was the so-called "October Manifesto"-- a comprehensive guarantee of civil rights and a broadly elected legislative assembly that (to paraphrase Hosking) tried to achieve in a few months what had taken hundreds of painful years to emerge elsewhere in Europe. As the second of the two texts (an excerpt from Witte's Memoirs) makes clear, neither Nicholas nor Witte were fully committed to such a sweeping statement of intent. Witte's after-the-fact rationalization notwithstanding, both seem to have lined up behind it primarily for tactical reasons. This high-level absence of conviction helps explain its less-than-full implementation.
1. In his Manifesto, how does Nicholas II justify the changes he proposes?
2. What specific policies does the Manifesto mandate?
3. What do Witte's Memoirs have to say about the process of drafting the Manifesto? How self-serving do you think his account is?
4. How does Witte say the Manifesto was received in provincial Russia?
The October Manifesto
17 October 1905 (o.s.)
We, Nicholas II, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, Tsar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc. etc., declare to all our loyal subjects:
The disturbances and unrest in St Petersburg, Moscow and in many other parts of our Empire have filled Our heart with great and profound sorrow. The welfare of the Russian Sovereign is inseparable from the welfare of His people, and national sorrow is His sorrow. The present disturbances could give rise to profound disaffection among the masses, presenting a threat to the unity and integrity of Our State. The oath which We took as Tsar compels Us to use all Our strength, intelligence and authority to put a speedy end to this unrest which is so dangerous for the State. The relevant authorities have been ordered to take measures to deal with direct outbreaks of disorder and violence and to protect people who only want to go about their daily business in peace. However, in view of the need for successful implementation of earlier measures aimed at pacifying the country, we have decided that the work of the higher agiencies of government must be coordinated. We have therefore ordered the government to take the following steps in fulfilment of our unbending will:
We call on all true sons of Russia to remember their duty to the homeland, to help put a stop to this unprecedented unrest and, together with this, to devote all their strength to the restoration of peace and quiet in our native land.
Issued at Peterhof on the 17th day of October in the year of Our Lord 1905, in the eleventh year of Our reign.
Original signed by Nicholas II.
Source: Unattributed translation from Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, 3rd series, vol. XXV/I, no. 26803. Revised (syntax emendations) Jon Bone.
Excerpt on the Manifesto from The Memoirs Of Count Witte
The Manifesto was drawn up hastily, and until the last moment I did not know whether His Majesty would sign it. Had it not been for Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich, (1) he possibly would not have done it. It is noteworthy that as soon as the Manifesto came out, the Grand Duke embraced the creed of the Black Hundreds. Prince A. D. Obolenskii, (2) one of its authors, was in a state of neurotic exhaustion at the time he took part in its drafting. Several days after the publication of the act, this earnest advocate told me that his participation in the movement for the Manifesto had been the greatest sin of his life. In the days immediately preceding its publication, His Majesty conducted two parallel sets of conferences. I participated in one, [I. L.] Goremykin (3) in the other. This extreme duplicity at such a critical time greatly discouraged me.
As a matter of fact, I was rather opposed to the publication of a constitutional manifesto. I gave much thought to the alternative plan of setting up a military dictatorship. The original text of the document was drafted against my will and behind my back. Seeing however that those on high were intent upon issuing the Manifesto, I insisted that my own version of it be adopted if I were to be appointed Prime Minister.
The effect of the act of October 17th was in many ways salutary. Thus for instance the Manifesto destroyed the unified front that had made the opposition camp so formidable. It sobered up the country, so that the voice of patriotism was heard in the land again. Propertied people got ready to do battle and rose in defense of their possessions. But it also had its serious drawbacks.
The Manifesto was a bolt from the blue. Most provincial authorities did not understand what was happening, and many clearly lacked sympathy for the new course of policy. Because the Manifesto arrived so unexpectedly, regions that had already been in tension were thrown into a frenzy by it. Violent outbreaks -- both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary -- took place all over the country, the reactionary manifestations involving (of course) anti-Jewish pogroms. (4) These last were organized (or at least encouraged) by local authorities. That is what I feared, and that was why I opposed the idea of issuing a Manifesto. Furthermore, it cast the shadow of undue haste upon all the other acts of the Government.
I did not for a moment doubt the necessity of a parliamentary regime for the country. In those days even the conservatives advocated a constitution. In fact, there were no conservatives in Russia on the eve of October 17, 1905. The Manifesto cut Russia's past from its present like a scalpel. This historic operation was surely necessary, but it should have been performed with greater care and more precautions. Still, I thank God that the constitution has been granted. It is far better that the past has been cut off (even though somewhat roughly and hurriedly) than if it had been slowly hacked off with a blunt saw wielded by a bungling surgeon....
Notes:
1. Nikolai Nikolaevich Romanov, the Tsar's first cousin once removed. Popular in military circles, he apparently was instrumental in convincing the Tsar that order could in fact be maintained if/when the Manifesto was signed.
2. Aleksandr Dmitrovich Obolenskii (1847-1917). Member of an old noble family, one of whom (E. P. Obolenskii) had been a noted Decembrist. Owner of the Bakhmet'ev glass factories from 1884, from 1892 the Head Procurator of the Second Department of the State Senate.
3. I. L. Goremykin, Minister of Internal Affairs 1895-1899, President of the Council of Ministers in April-June 1906 and again 1914-1916. A counter-reformer and opponent of the progressive bloc in the Duma, he was considered a protege of Tsarina Alexandra and of Grigorii Rasputin.
4. Pogrom = Orchestrated violence (up to outright massacre) against a targeted social group, especially Jews. From a Russian root meaning "to cause havoc."
Translation excerpted from the Memoirs (Vospominaniia) of Count Witte. Revised (syntactical changes, notes, repunctuation and other emendation) by Jon Bone.