Nineteenth-century Russian intellectuals split into main two opposing camps over the question of Russia's identity and orientation. So-called Westernizers, following the tradition of Peter I and Catherine II, looked to Western Europe for inspiration. Arguing (as had Catherine) that Russia was fundamentally European, (1) they sought to foster scientific innovation, advocated constitutional government, and argued for liberal rights including freedom of expression. Their opponents, the so-called Slavophiles, held that Russia was -- and ought to stay -- different from Europe. Praising the virtues of Slavic culture in general, and of Russia in particular, they contended that Russia's destiny lay in following its own path to greatness. A particularly strident form of Slavophilism was the so-called Pan-Slavic movement, whose members wanted to unite all the Slavic-origin peoples in Eastern Europe into a federated union dominated by Russia. Perhaps no work captures the flavor of Pan-Slavism better than Nikolai Danilevskii's Russia And Europe, which first appeared in 1871. Anticipating the clash-of-civilizations ideas of Samuel Huntingdon by more than a century, (2) Danilevskii argued that Slavs and Europeans inevitably would come into conflict -- in which case it behooved the Slavic world to organize to meet the challenge.

1. Why does Danilevskii say there needs to be a Pan-Slavic Union, and why should Moscow be its center? Do his ideas have merit?

2. Why does Danilevskii think that Russia is fundamentally non-European?

3. What does he say will happen to Russia and to the other Slavic nations if a Pan-Slavic Union is not formed? Do you find this a convincing argument for action?

4. According to Danilevskii, why should Europe have nothing to fear from the successful formation of a Pan-Slavic Union?

Moscow -- the city of the Tsars -- should not be the capital of Russia, but the capital of a Pan-Slavic Union ....

This Pan-Slavic Union should consist of the following states:

• The Russian Empire, to which should be added all of Galicia and Hungarian Rus [present-day Carpatho-Ukraine] ;

• The Bohemian-Moravian-Slovak Kingdom, consisting, in addition to Bohemia proper, of that part of Moravia and Northwest Hungary inhabited exclusively or predominantly by Slovaks, with approximately 9,000,000 inhabitants and 1800 square miles;

• The Serbo-Croatian-Slovene Kingdom, consisting of the Principality of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Old Serbia, Northern Albania, Serbian Voivodina and Banat, Croatia, Slovenia, Dalmatia, the Military Frontiers, the Duchy of Krajna, Hertz, Gradishche, Istria, the Trieste District, two-thirds of Corinthia, and one-fifth of Styria up to the Drava River, with a combined population of about 8,000,000, and a territory of about 4500 square miles.

• The Bulgarian Kingdom, with Bulgaria and a large part of Rumelia and Macedonia, with 6,000,000 to 7,000,000 inhabitants, and about 3000 square miles.

• The Rumanian Kingdom with Wallachia, Moldavia, a portion of Bukovina, half of Transylvania approximately to the Maros River, and that part of Western Bes­sarabia inhabited predominantly by the Moldavians. In return for this exchange, Russia should receive the severed part of southern Bessarabia, including the Danube Delta and the Dobrudgea Peninsula. This [Rumanian Kingdom] would comprise about 7,000,000 inhabitants, and more than 3000 square miles.

• The Greek Kingdom with the addition to its present territory of Thessaly, Epirus, southwestern parts of Macedonia, all of the islands of the Aegean Archi­pelago, Rhodes, Crete, Cyprus, and the coasts of Asia Minor and of the Aegean Sea, with approximately 2,800 or 3,000 square miles, and a population of about 4,000,000.

• The Magyar Kingdom, with Hungary and Transylvania, excluding those parts which are inhabited by non-Magyar peoples and which should be added to Russia, Bohemia, Serbia, and Rumania, respectively, with a population of about 7,000,000, and 3000 square miles.

• The Constantinople District, with the adjacent portions of Rumelia and Asia Minor which surround the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles with the Gallipoli Peninsula, and Tenedos Island, with approximately 2,000,000 inhabitants.

Such a Union would consist mainly of peoples whose blood and spirit are homogeneous and would be about 125,000,000 strong. In the City of the Tsars they would find a natural center for their moral and material unity. This development would provide a total and intelligent solution to the Eastern Question, and therefore the only possible one. Controlling only what legally belongs to it, not endangering anyone, and not being afraid of any threats, such a Union could withstand all strife and misfortune. It would march peacefully along the road of independent development ....

A distinctive Slavic culture can rise only on the firm foundation of a Pan-Slavic Union. It is the condition above all else of such development. That is the general thrust, the main conclusion of our entire investigation. Therefore we shall not stop now to cite cultural-historical evidence of the significance, value, and necessity of such an arrangement. In this chapter I intend to develop, from a more specialized political viewpoint, the importance, value, and need for Slavic unity in a unified federal system.

We have seen above that Russia cannot be considered an integral part of Europe, either by culture or adoption. Only two possibilities are available to her: either form a distinct, independent cultural unity with other Slavs, or lose all cultural-historical significance and be nothing ....

Russia’s internal structure is alien to the European world. Though she is strong and powerful enough to play a role as one of the members of the European family and as one of the great European powers, Russia can acquire a distinguished place in history for herself and for Slavdom in no better way than as the leader of a unique, independent political system of states. In her totality and unity, she should serve as a counterweight to Europe. These are the advantages, the benefits, and the essence of the Pan-Slavic Union for Russia. If Russia fails to become the representative of the Slavic world she inevitably will forget the historic reason for her existence. On a vast scale, she will present to the world a pitiful example of what happens to countries that are ignorant of history. From a more immediate perspective, she can hold on to her external independence for years (if not centuries). She can even be a great political force, however devoid of internal meaning and content.

However the significance of the Union is even more important for Balkan Slavdom. For the other Slavic nations the question is more blunt. Their concern is not with the historical essence of their life, nor with their great historical role, but simply with existence -- the daily bread of their national life, so to speak. The question "to be or not to be" presents itself in the most prosaic (and therefore in the most fearful and tragic) form. We examined this question in sufficient depth in Chapter 13, and there is no need to repeat it here....

...

Another straw man frightening people away from Pan-Slavism is the fear of a worldwide monarchy, the fear of world domination. It is clear from the above that if world sovereignty is the natural, necessary consequence of a Pan-Slavic Union, it will not be especially Russian, but Pan-Slavic. There will be nothing for the Slavs to fear. The thought of world sovereignty did not frighten the ancient Romans. England does not fear the idea of world-wide maritime sovereignty, extending her control by spanning the seas and oceans with a chain of colonies both large and small. The notion of limitless sovereignty from Greenland to Tierra del Fuego does not frighten America either. What strange modesty -- to recoil before a great future, to shun it because of the fear of being too powerful and strong! Voltaire once said that if God did not exist it would be necessary to invent Him. It is a parody to apply this thought to building up Austria with an eye to preventing Slavic misfortune [in the Balkans]....

But this is not the question. The fear itself has no basis. The Pan-Slavic Union, having assured the freedom of the Slavs and their fruitful interaction with one another, would not be able to threaten the independence of anyone, nor of anyone's legal rights. Again, the most simple statistical calculation proves this. The combined population of just the parts of Europe currently playing an active political role, e.g. greater Germany (excluding the non-German portion of Austria), France and England, plus Belgium and Holland (who are surrounded by the aforementioned, and who must voluntarily or involuntarily follow them), would equal the population of the entire Pan-Slavic Union. With the addition of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the Scandinavian states, there would be an advantage of at least fifty million people on the side of Europe. Thus the Slavic system of states would still be significantly weaker than Europe in terms of population. It could consider itself invincible only as far as defending and protecting Slavic independence and originality. The strength disparity would be only slightly equalized by the (previously discussed) strategic locations of Constantinople and the Czech bastion....